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I.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing use of expert witnesses in almost every type of
litigation has resulted in trial lawyers' attempting to expand the traditional limits that have been placed on the scope of opinion testimony. One of the issues currently causing conflict is whether an
expert may express an opinion on a legal issue that the judge or
jury will subsequently decide. Counsel may seek to elicit from an
expert an opinion on whether a physician's medical treatment was
negligent or whether the accused was involved in certain drug-related
activity. Beyond the traditional type of expert opinion, a party may
offer testimony of a lawyer to explain to the jury the applicable
substantive law. The admissibility of this type of opinion involves
* Mason Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University, College of Law; B.S. 1962,
Iowa State University; J.D. 1964, University of Iowa. The author would like to thank Peter Mirfield
and Nat Stern for their comments on an earlier version of this Article and Gregory Hearing and
Mary Casteel for their valuable research assistance. This Article was supported by a research leave
from the Florida State University College of Law.
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the question of whether the witness is testifying in the form of a
"legal conclusion," which traditionally has been condemned.'
Unfortunately, federal courts have not exhibited a clear understanding of when opinion testimony involves a legal conclusion and
whether the prohibition against opinions in that form is still viable.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide unambiguous guidance because they do not directly address the admissibility of opinion
testimony in the form of legal conclusions. The general approach
of the Federal Rules is to admit opinion testimony when it will be
an appreciable help to the jury.2 Opinions are excluded when they
do not meet the test of helpfulness or when they run afoul of Rule
403 criteria, such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, waste
of time, or misleading the jury. Appellate courts have vested broad
discretion in trial courts to determine whether expert testimony is
4
admissible.
Federal Rule 704(a) restates the view of the earlier evidence codifications that opinion testimony which is "otherwise admissible is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact." Inclusion of the indefinite term "otherwise
admissible" within Rule 704(a) suggests that the prohibition regarding legal conclusions, as well as other pre-Rules restrictions, may
be included by implication.
This article addresses the admissibility under the Federal Rules
of Evidence of three types of opinion testimony which may involve
the admissibility of testimony in the form of a legal conclusion. The
first involves testimony embracing an ultimate issue of fact. The
paper concludes that these opinions should be routinely admitted,
as jurors are able to determine whether the testimony should be
1. See, e.g., Kostelecky v. NL Acme Tool/NL Indus. Inc., 837 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1988);

Hogan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Milton,
555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally, Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony:
Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. Mua L. Rav. 831 (1988).

2. See FED. R. Evm. 702; Little Oil Co. v. AtI. Richfield Co., 852 F.2d 441, 446 (9th Cir.
1988); Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 792 (1989);
3 J. NVINsmEN & M. BERGER, WEmNsTEIN's EvDENCE 702[01], at 702-07 (1987) [hereinafter WINsTEiN]; J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1923, at 29-32 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WioMoRE].

3. WmsmNm, supra note 2, 1 702[02], at 702-18-22.
4. Id. at 702-22-26.
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accepted or rejected. Closely related to testimony embracing an ultimate fact is testimony in which the expert is asked to go a step
further and apply a legal standard or definition to those facts. This
paper will also examine the conflict in recent federal decisions involving the admissibility of this type of opinion testimony and examine the legislative history and underlying policy considerations.
This section argues that because of the danger of misleading the
jury, the federal courts should apply the intent of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence and restrict the admissibility of opinion testimony when the witness testifies as to
whether certain conduct conforms to a particular legal standard.
Disagreement concerning a third type of opinion testimony, which
may involve a legal conclusion, has resulted from counsel's stretching traditional rules even further by asking experts to express their
opinions on substantive law. An expert's description of the law may
be broader or even different from those included in the trial judge's
instructions to the jury. The policies supporting and opposing the
admission of this testimony will be examined, and this article will
conclude that expert testimony as to the law should continue to be
prohibited. The primary reason for this exclusion is that testimony
relating to the substantive law remains inconsistent with the role of
the trial judge to determine the law and to instruct the jury upon
it.
II.

ULTnmATE FACTUAL IssUJE

The admissibility of opinions which contain a legal conclusion
is closely related to the issue of whether a witness may render an
opinion on an "ultimate issue" to be determined by the jury.5 These
latter opinions have often been met with the objection that they
"invade the province of the jury" or they "usurp the function of
the jury." While in the past there was some acceptance of such a
general limitation on opinion testimony,6 such objections are what

5. See Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARv. L. Rnv. 797 (1984).
6. See Healy v. Nordhous, 40 II1. App. 2d 320, 324, 188 N.E.2d 227, 229 (1963); Van Voorhis,
Expert Opinion Evidence, 13 N.Y.L.F. 651 (1967); Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status,
Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41 DEN. L. CENT. J. 226 (1964).
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Wigmore called "empty rhetoric" since no one may force jurors to
"accept the witness' opinion against their own." ' 7
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, many
jurisdictions rejected this restrictive view and did not limit the admissibility of opinion testimony which embraced an ultimate factual
issue to be decided by the jury. 8 A helpful analysis of the issue is
contained in Grismore v. ConsolidatedProducts Co.,9 where a farmer
sued a feed company alleging that the defendant's feed had caused
the death of his turkeys. The defendant argued that the admission
of opinion testimony regarding whether the feed had caused the
turkeys to lose weight and die was error. The Grismore court rejected
the contention that the testimony invaded the province of the jury,
stating that the argument stemmed from a "misconception of the
necessity and purpose of opinion testimony."' 0 The court reasoned
that opinion testimony can never invade or usurp the province of
the jury since admissible opinion testimony should be treated the
same as fact testimony. Just as fact testimony is not excluded because it might be "decisive of an ultimate fact," the court reasoned
that this opinion testimony should not be barred since the purpose
of the opinion testimony is to aid the jury in ascertaining the truth.
The jury has the ultimate responsibility of determining whether to
accept or reject the opinion, just as it may accept or reject any other
testimony.
Other reasons for the admission of opinion testimony have been
suggested by Judge Weinstein, who focuses upon the practical difficulty in applying such a standard. Weinstein observed that distinguishing between an ultimate fact and a non-ultimate fact "proved
impossible" in many instances. He also noted that it was sometimes
impossible for a witness to testify to anything but an ultimate fact."

7.

WIGMORE,

supra note 2, § 1920, at 18-21.

8. See, e.g., M.orton's Adm'r v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 282 Ky. 174, 138
S.W.2d 345 (1940); Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, 812 (Tex. 1965).
9. 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
10. Id. at 344, 5 N.W.2d 655.
11. WE NsTEN, supra note 2,
704[01], at 704-06.
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Opinion testimony concerning an ultimate factual issue has rather
routinely been admitted under Rule 704(a).1 2 In cases where the opinion testimony has been admitted, the expert does not apply a legal
standard or definition to the facts, rather, the expert couches the
opinion in terms of the factual issues to be decided by the jury.
For example, the admissibility of opinion testimony that an explosion was the factual cause of the plaintiff's injuries 3 and that the
defendant was intoxicated 4 has recently been affirmed.
While the admission of expert testimony involving ultimate facts
usually involves little difficulty, the recent trend of prosecutors' offering such testimony in criminal cases has caused concern. Typically, testimony of the prosecution's eye-witnesses shows that the
defendant has engaged in certain actions. Then a law enforcement
officer will be qualified as an expert, and the prosecution elicits the
officer's opinion as to the type of conduct or modus operandi found
in connection with a criminal activity.,- The jury is able to infer
that the defendant committed the crime charged because the defendant's actions conformed to those usually found in connection with
the commission of that crime.
Frequently the prosecution is not content to permit the jury to
draw the inference, but rather goes the next step and asks the expert
to express an opinion on the fact to be inferred, that is, that the
conduct of the defendant fits the pattern or modus operandi used

12. See United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1987) (in arson trial expert opinion
that fire was purposefully set and was not accidental); Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d
525 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs did not offer expert opinion that churning of a brokerage account
occurred, but rather offered admissible opinion to the significance of various types of transactions
and whether they were appropriate for the plaintiffs account); Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21, 680 S.W.2d
686 (1984) (officer's opinion that defendant was intoxicated).
13. See Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1557 (0th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony as to the cause of the explosion which
damaged the plaintiff). Similarly in Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989), there
was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's admission of expert testimony that certain "jetties"
on a river did not cause the flooding on the plaintiffs property.
14. Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21, 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984).
15. See United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1134 (2d Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5792 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1989) (,VEsTLAw 129717); United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693,
696 (2d Cir. 1989).

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

in the crime charged. 16 For example, there has been no abuse of
discretion in the admission of expert testimony that the defendant
acted as a "steerer" in a drug transaction, 17 that a transaction on
a street corner appeared to be a drug sale, 8 and that certain coded
language related to narcotics and "specifically heroin."' 9 At the same
time appellate courts have upheld the admission of the foregoing
opinions, they have voiced concerns that such opinions are
"offensive" 20 or create "some degree of discomfiture ' 2' and give
the government an additional summation by having the expert interpret the evidence.Y However, the admission of such opinions have

rarely been found to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion.2 3

The most persuasive reason to exclude expert opinion testimony
on ultimate facts is that it is the equivalent of the expert's rendering

an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, which is
impermissible. 4 On the other hand, with the sophistication of many
criminal enterprises and the complexity of many prosecutions, this
type of expert testimony is probably necessary to enable the jury to
understand the significance of the defendant's actions.
III.

APPLICATION OF A LEGAL STANDARD OR DEFINITION

A.

Pre-FederalRules
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, jurisdictions that did not exclude expert opinions because they involved

16. In United States v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1989) an expert testified regarding
"counter-surveillance" techniques used by drug dealers to avoid detection and that the defendant's
actions "definitely constituted countersurveillance." See United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d
1537, 1543 (2d Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5949 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1989) (WasLAw 137209)
(suggesting that defense counsel's cross-examination opened-the-door to the testimony).
17. United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
18. United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983).
See DeSoto, 885 F.2d at 361-62 (7th Cir. 1989) (opinion notes that there appears to be authority that
officer could testify that defendants were conducting "dope-deals").
19. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1308 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
357 (1987), cert. denied sub nom., Annabi v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1018 (1988).
20. Brown, 776 F.2d at 401.
21. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1308, cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 357 (1987), cert. denied sub nom.,
Annabi v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1018 (1988).
22. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1308.
23. See United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616-18 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
543 (1989).
24. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 612
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1243 (1988) distinguishes expert testimony regarding the usual
criminal modus operandi from a direct opinion upon the defendant's guilt.
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an ultimate issue of fact generally continued to recognize other restrictions upon such testimony. 25 For example, the Grismore court
cautioned that if the opinion did not concern a factual issue, but
rather concerned "mixed questions of law and fact," an expert should
not be permitted to testify thereto. 26 An opinion involves a mixed
question of law and fact when a standard or measure has been fixed
by law and the question is whether the person or conduct measures
up to that standard. According to Grismore, the trial judge must
instruct the jury as to the applicable legal standard and the jury
must then conclude from the facts whether that standard was met.
Thus, a witness would not be permitted to testify to the guilt of
the defendant, to the presence or absence of negligence, or to the
capacity to execute a legal document. 27
Dean Mason Ladd further refined this analysis when he suggested
that in a will contest involving mental capacity, if a witness were
asked "if he believed the testator had the mental capacity to make
a will," ' the witness could have in mind a much higher or a much
lower standard of competency than the law requires. Therefore, Dean
Ladd suggested that counsel should ask whether the "testator had
the mental capacity to appreciate the nature and extent of his holdings and the natural objects of his bounty." 29
The early evidence codifications, the Model Code of Evidence,
and the original Uniform Rules of Evidence contained provisions to
the effect that opinion testimony was not inadmissible because it
embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.30 Al25. See Skelton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 375 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1962); Morton's Adm'r v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 282 Ky. 174, 138 S.W.2d 345 (1940); Duncan v. Atchinson T.
& S.F. Ry., 86 Kan. 112, 119 P. 356 (1911).
26. 232 Iowa at 361, 5 N.W.2d at 663.
27. Id.
28. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 V~AD. L. R-v. 414, 424 (1952). Dean Ladd served on the
Evidence Editorial group which drafted the Model Code for consideration by the American Law
Institute, see AmERicAN LAw INSTITuTE, MODEL CODE OF EV-MENCE xi-xii (1942), was a member of

the Special Committee on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMwSIONERS ON UNiFORm STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF TnE NATiONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMssIONERS ON

UNsoRm STATE LAWS, 21 (1952), and was a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure at the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted, see 46 F.R.D. 161, 162 (1969).
29. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 424 (1952).
30. Rule 401 of the Model Code of Evidence provides: "In testifying to what he has perceived
a witness, whether or not an expert, may give his testimony in terms which include inferences and

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92

though there are no official comments discussing the issue, appar-

ently the codifications were not intended to eliminate the restriction
on opinions relating to a mixed question of law and fact. 31
B. Federal Rules
Although Federal Rule 704(a) recognizes that an opinion relating
to an ultimate issue is not objectionable if the opinion is "otherwise
admissible," the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules apparently intended that the distinction between an ultimate factual issue
and a mixed question of law and fact continue. In its Notes to Rule
704(a), the Committee cautions:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit
all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of
fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These
provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would
merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oathhelpers of an earlier day. They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus the question, "Did T have
capacity to make a will?" would be excluded, while the question, "Did T have
sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and the
natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?"
32
would be allowed.

The Advisory Committee's use of the same example used by Dean

Ladd years earlier was probably more than coincidence since at the
time the Notes were drafted he was a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference. 33

may state all relevant inferences, whether or not embracing ultimate issues to be decided by the trier
of fact....
" (emphasis added).
Uniform Rule of Evidence 56(4) provides: "Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
otherwise admissible under these rules is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or
issues to be decided by the trier of the fact." Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) is nearly identical.
UNix. R. Evm. 56(4) (1953).
31. In Ladd, Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L. Rav. 437, 445 (1956), Dean
Ladd commented that "the Grismore case ... is in direct accord with Uniform Rule 56(4)."
32. 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1973).
33. Ehrhardt, In Memoriam Mason Ladd, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 161 (1980). The Court recently
reaffirmed the significance of Dean Ladd's writings on the construction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1986 n.1l (1989).
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Federal appellate decisions interpreting Rule 704 sometimes ignore the above limitation. The problem is illustrated by two recent
Eleventh Circuit decisions. In Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp. ,4
a medical malpractice case, the court upheld the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant-doctor was "negligent." Subsequently, a seemingly conflicting result was reached in
Parkerv. Williams 3 - a case involving a section 1983 civil rights claim
against a sheriff for employing a jailer who allegedly had raped and
kidnapped the plaintiff. The Eleventh Circuit found no reversible
error in the trial judge's admission of the opinion of an expert in
correctional facilities that the sheriff was "grossly negligent" in employing the jailer. 36 Among the reasons stated by the Eleventh Circuit
for upholding the admission of this expert testimony was the fact
that the trial court instructed the jury on the legal meaning of gross
negligence. 37 Because of this instruction, the court reasoned that the
jury would not be mislead by the expert's opinion. 38 Within three
years, the Eleventh Circuit upheld both the exclusion39 of expert
opinion testimony on a defendant's "negligence" and the admission
4
of expert opinion testimony on a defendant's "gross negligence."
Inconsistent results have been demonstrated by a variety of other
decisions. For example, the exclusion of expert opinion has been
determined to be within the discretion of the trial court in a negligence action when it pertained to whether the defendant's conduct

34. 744 F.2d 1467 (1lth Cir. 1984). See also McGowan v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 863 F.2d 1266,

1272-73 (6th Cir. 1988) (no error in excluding opinion testimony that action of factory representative
was negligent).
35. 855 F.2d 763 (lth Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 862 F.2d 1471 (1989). See also
Shad, 799 F.2d at 530 (reversible error to exclude evidence that the defendant's actions evidenced a

"reckless disregard" for plaintiff's interests); Wilson v. State, 669 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1983) (no error

in admitting opinion regarding defendant's negligence).
36. Parker, 855 F.2d at 777.
37. Id. at 777-78. The opinion also relied upon the wide discretion afforded the trial court in
admitting expert testimony, a jury instruction regarding the proper weight to be given expert testimony

and the conclusion that if the ruling was erroneous, it was not reversible error. Id.
38. Id.
39. See McGowan, 863 F.2d at 1272-73. Compare Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.,
882 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1989) (reversible error to admit opinion of "forensic engineer" that railroad

was negligent when it struck plaintiff).
40. See Shad, 799 F.2d at 530; Wilson v. State, 669 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1983) (no error in
admitting opinion regarding defendant's negligence).

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

was the legal 41 or proximate42 cause of the accident, whether various
product warnings were so inadequate as to make the products unreasonably dangerous in a product liability action, 43 and whether the
defendant had the necessary intent in a prosecution for misapplication of bank funds." The denial of an accused's right to a fair
trial was found in large part from the admission in a murder prosecution of expert testimony that there was no evidence of the involvement of any suspect other than the defendant. According to
the Sixth Circuit, the admission of opinion testimony that "went
directly to the heart of the issue concerning guilt or innocence"
46
impinged upon fundamental fairness.
At the same time, appellate courts have found no abuse of dis-

cretion in the trial court's admission of expert opinion that a product
was "unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the average
user" and that the defendant acted "recklessly" in producing and
distributing

it,

47

that certain expenses are deductible under the fed-

eral tax laws in a federal income tax prosecution, 48 that the defen41. Kostelecky, 837 F.2d at 830; Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983).
In Smogor v. Enke, 874 F.2d 295, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1989), there was no abuse of the trial court's
discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony concerning whether the defendant's actions were
negligent and the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries when the expert's answer was preceded
by counsel's making a "precise statement of the law."
42. Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 770 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally,
Steinbock, Richman & Ray, Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 VAND. L. RPv. 261 (1988).
43. Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Harris
v. Pacific Floor Mach. Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1988).
44. United States v. Ness, 665 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1981). The court expressed concern with
witness who was unfamiliar with standards established by the criminal law being permitted to express an opinion and concluded that the jury could easily accord it too much weight. Id. The court
concluded that this testimony was not "otherwise admissible" under FED. R. Evm. Rule 704. Id. See
also Matter of Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1121, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 803 (1984) (expert testimony
"about who caused Cheryl's sexual injuries" is not admissible); Downer v. Bramet, 152 Cal. App.
3d 837, 841-42, 199 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832-33 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in excluding expert testimony
that the transfer of property was a gift).
45. Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1988).
46. Id.
47. Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987). Compare Harris v. Pacific
Floor Mach. Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1988) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to permit
expert witness to give opinion on adequacy of warnings in a product liability action but rather to
limit testimony to the criteria by which he should form such an opinion).
48. United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905
(1982). See also United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal revenue agent
was permitted to testify as an expert witness as to the deductibility of an interest deduction taken
by taxpayer on his return).
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dant willfully and intentionally increased his income knowing he had
not reported the taxes on the increase, 49 that the defendant was involved in the distribution of cocaine, 0 that the method of shipping
materials which caused the plaintiff personal injuries was a "booby
trap," 51 and that the device manufactured and possessed by the defendant would "have to be registered with the Department of Treasury" in a prosecution for the manufacture and possession of an
52
unregistered firearm.

The silence of the Federal Rules on the admissibility of these
opinions could lead counsel and the court to believe that the restrictions on mixed question's of law and fact are no longer effective.
Without the benefit of the traditional analysis, it could be concluded
that allowing an expert to apply a legal standard to ultimate factual
conclusions would possess, at least, a modicum of helpfulness and
therefore meet the standard of Rule 702.
At least two other reasons may explain the admissibility of these
opinions. First, the Federal Rules relaxed many other common law
restrictions on expert testimony.5 3 The tendency may be to interpret
opinions applying legal standards in the same relaxed manner, particularly in light of the difficulty in distinguishing between opinions
of ultimate facts and opinions involving mixed questions of law and

49. United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987), modified, 821 F.2d 1034
(5th Cir. 1987) (expert's opinion did not violate Rule 704(b)).
50. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 387-89 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2882,
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 99 (1988). See United States v. Battle, 859 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1988) (scales
seized were common in drug or heroin operations); United States v. Anderson, 817 F.2d 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 801 (1989) (in prosecution for interstate transportation of minor
for prostitution, not reversible error in the admission of sociologist's testimony concerning the modus
operandi of pimps and the pimp-prostitute relationship).
51. Coleman v. Parkline Corp., 844 F.2d 863, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
52. United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986). The decision distinguished
between "unadorned legal conclusions" which are impermissible and "the expression of expert opinions on ultimate issues of fact" which courts allow. Id. at 484. See also State v. Saunders, 317
N.C. 308, 314, 345 S.E.2d 212, 216 (1986) (When defendant asserted self-defense to a murder charge,
no error was found in admitting expert testimony that victim's wound "was not a self-defense type
of wound."); Miller v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 766, 404 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1978)
(no error in admitting expert testimony that floor was unsafe).
53. For example, Rule 705 no longer requires the presentation of a hypothetical question and
Rule 704 no longer requires an expert to rely on evidence admitted at trial. See also Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 450 (1988).
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fact. 54 The other reason is the great discretion afforded trial judges
by the appellate courts in determining whether opinion testimony is
admissible. This deferential philosophy resulted in appellate opinions
which affirmed the trial court's admission of such opinion testimony, on the basis that there was no clear abuse of the trial court's
discretion, 5 and then simply paraphrased the applicable Federal Rule
56

of Evidence.

Recently, at least one circuit has expressed concern with respect
to the latter approach to a number of issues dealing with expert
testimony. The Fifth Circuit stated:
[w]e recognize the temptation [of the trial judge] to answer objections to receipt
of expert testimony with the shorthand remark that the jury will give it "the
weight it deserves." This nigh reflexive explanation may be sound in some case
[sic], but in others it can mask a failure by the trial judge to come to grips with
an important trial decisionY

The court noted that frequently expert witnesses were used simply
to become advocates for one party or the other.5 8 The Fifth Circuit

rejected the use of experts for this purpose stating that "the trial
judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more
than the lawyers can offer in argument. ' 59 The court suggested that
if an expert simply served this purpose, it was neither assisting the
trier of fact to understand the evidence nor helping to determine
the fact in issueA0
54. See Town of Palm Beach v. Palm Beach County, 460 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. 1984) ("While
this is to some degree a matter of semantics, we find the distinction necessary.").
55. See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986).
56. For example, even though the Second Circuit found it "rather offensive" to permit an
expert to testify that a certain pattern of conduct is often found in narcotics cases and that defendant's
conduct fit that pattern, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony. Brown,
776 F.2d at 401, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (court noted that the 403 balancing test would
not result in exclusion of evidence).
57. In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1233. See generally Fanning, Experts up to Here,
FoRBs, July 13, 1987, at 378.
58. In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1233.
59. Id.
60. The Fifth Circuit also voiced concern about the competency of experts and the opinions
which they expressed. The court noted two signals trial judges might consider in determining whether
to admit proffered expert testimony:
First, many experts are members of the academic community who supplement their teaching
salaries with consulting work. We know from our judicial experience that many such able
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The ultimate test for expert testimony under the Federal Rules,
including opinions applying legal standards, is whether the jury will
receive "appreciable help" from the opinion. 61 If the jury is aware

of the expert's opinion regarding the underlying facts, asking him
or her to apply a legal definition may not meet this standard. 62 The
answer to the final question applying the legal standard adds little

to the prior testimony of the expert. In addition, there is concern
that allowing an expert to express an opinion as to whether a legal

standard has been violated will invade the province of the trial judge
to determine the applicable law and instruct the jury based on it.63
The strongest argument in favor of the exclusion of these opi-

64
nions was made by the Sixth Circuit in Torres v. County of Oakland,

where a county employee filed an employment discrimination action

based on national origin. The trial court's decision to permit a witness to testify whether she believed the plaintiff had been "discriminated against because of her national origin" was found to be error
because the question called for an improper legal conclusion.6 5 The
persons present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing to express in
an article submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline in other contexts subject to
peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with many others, that ought to
be considered in deciding whether to accept expert testimony. Second, the professional expert
is now commonplace. That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting with
attorneys and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions are available
to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law, before a jury, and with
the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he is an "expert."
Id. at 1234.
As a result, the Fifth Circuit clearly indicated that it would review the admission of expert
testimony:
with a sharp eye, particularly in those instances, hopefully few, where the record makes it
evident that the decision to receive expert testimony was simply tossed off to the jury under
a 'let it all in' philosophy. Our message to our able trial colleagues: it is time to take hold
of expert testimony in federal trials.
Id.
61. Little OR Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 852 F.2d 441, 446 (9th Cir. 1988).
62. See Id. (No abuse of discretion in excluding opinion regarding ultimate issue in light of
extensive testimony of over four hundred pages by expert. "The ultimate facts in question do not
meet the 'appreciable help' test of FED. R. EvID. 702. Taylor had already given the jury the facts
it needed to draw its own conclusions regarding ARCO's marketing practices."); Kostelecky, 837 F.2d
at 830. But see Wilson v. State, 669 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1983) (opinion regarding defendant's negligence
was proper when counsel's question defined the standard).
63. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151.
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Torres court reasoned that since the term "discriminate," as used
by the witness, had a "separate, distinct and specialized meaning
in the law different from that present in the vernacular," exclusion
of this testimony was appropriate. 6 Because there was no assurance

that the definition of the word "discriminate" used by the witness
would be the same as the definition supplied by the law, the opinion
did not meet the test of helpfulness. 67 Therefore, the jury could be

68
mislead and confused by the testimony.
The Torres court noted, however, that if counsel had framed a
more careful question, much of the same information could have
been elicited without the testimony having involved a legal conclu-

sion. 69 For example, if the witness had been asked whether she be-

lieved the plaintiff's national origin "motivated" the hiring decision,
the question would have been appropriate since the significance of

the testimony would have been clear to the jury, and they could
have clearly understood the issue upon which the witness was tes70
tifying.
A short time thereafter the Sixth Circuit decided Mitroff v.
Xomox Corp., 71 an age discrimination suit in which the trial judge
66. Id. Although the testimony in Torres was offered as lay opinion, the Sixth Circuit found
it to be inadmissible under Rule 704. The analysis would be the same if the testimony was offered
under Rule 701 or 702. Id. at 150. See also United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir.
1987), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1988) (expert opinion
as to "whether the false statements ... would have 'the capacity to influence' a loan officer" was
appropriate while opinion that the statements were material was not admissible).
67. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151.
68. Occasionally the suggestion has been made that if the opinion applying a legal standard is
admitted, and the court subsequently instructs the jury as to the legal definition of the terms used
by the witness, the jury will not be mislead since it is aware of the necessary criteria. See Parker v.
Williams, 855 F.2d 763, 777 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir.
1989). However, this analysis overlooks the danger that the witness will not employ the same definition
as does the law reflected in the instructions, and therefore the jury will be mislead.
69. 758 F.2d at 151.
70. The Torres opinion commented that an earlier Sixth Circuit opinion, Davis v. Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the trial court's decision permitting a business
school professor to testify as to whether or not discrimination had occurred comported "with our
analysis of this case." 758 F.2d at 151. While the Davis opinion is unclear, it appears that the testimony
of the business school professor may have been admissible because he was an expert who would be
familiar with the legal definition of age discrimination and therefore the court could be assured that
his definition of age discrimination would be the same as that provided by the law. Davis, 742 F.2d
at 916. Therefore, the professor's opinion concerning age discrimination would not mislead the jury.
71. 797 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1986).
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admitted the testimony of defendant's assistant personnel manager
that "there was a pattern of age discrimination at Xomox." The
Sixth Circuit found the proffered testimony inadmissible regardless
of whether it was offered as lay or expert opinion. 72 No foundation
had been laid to qualify the witness as an expert "to give a legal
conclusion as to the existence of age discrimination. ' 73 More importantly, the Mitroff opinion noted that lay opinion generally is
not admissible under Rule 704 because it usually would not "meet
the test of being helpful to the trier of fact since the jury's opinion
is as good as the witness' and the witness turns into little more than
an 'oath helper."' 7 4
Although the court in Mitroff did not conduct a Torres analysis,
it seems clear that had it done so, it would have reached the same
result since there was no indication that the lay witness used any
definition of discrimination other than his own. Had the witness in
Mitroff been an expert, the likelihood of the witness using the accepted legal definition of terms like discrimination would have increased.
75
A similar rationale was recently applied in United States v. Scop
where the Second Circuit found that during a mail and securities
fraud prosecution, the trial court committed reversible error by admitting expert opinion that "drew directly upon the language of the
statute and accompanying regulations concerning 'manipulation' and
'fraud' .... [The terms] '[m]anipulation,' 'scheme to defraud,' and
'fraud' are not self-defining terms but rather have been the subject
of diverse judicial interpretations. "76 The court distinguished prior
decisions permitting the use of opinion testimony in narcotics cases
on the basis that in those cases the experts were not77 asked to express
their opinions using statutory terms or language.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 276.
74. Id. at 277.
75. 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 140. See also F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 366 (1989).
77. Id. at 141-42. See Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121 (1983) (ordinarily, witness in DWI prosecution should not be permitted to testify that defendant was "drunk,"
"under the influence" or "intoxicated").
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The Scop decision recognized a second significant reason to ex-

clude this testimony: that the opinions could not have been helpful
to the jury because their use would give the appearance that the
trial judge was shifting to the expert witnesses the primary respon-

sibility of deciding the case. The jury may simply defer to the opinion of the expert, rather than exercising its own independent judgment

in determining whether the facts met a particular legal standard as
a result of the "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" which
surrounds the expert's opinions. 78

The Torres rationale is the same as that espoused by Dean Ladd

many years ago. The most significant reason for exclusion of the
opinion testimony is not due to the issue upon which the witness
is testifying, but rather that there can be no assurance that the witness is using a term or legal expression in the same sense that the
statutes and appellate decisions have defined the critical words of
art.

79

1.

Federal Rule 704(b)

In 1984, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 was amended by Congress
to eliminate the "confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses

testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate

78. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (lst Cir. 1979); Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 600,
680 P.2d at 136 (1983). The stature of the expert may cause the jury to rely upon the expert's opinion
rather than the jury's making its own judgment. Similarly, since the expert has already thought the
problem through, the jury may defer to the expert.
79. Cleary argues that lawyers will "seldom" ask a witness about a term "except when the
popular meaning is the same as the legal meaning." McCoRaMcK oNr EvmaNCE § 12, at 32 (E. Cleary
3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCoRmcK]. Neither the reported cases nor experience seem to support
this observation. For example, in Andrews v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co., 882 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1989), there was reversible error in the admission of expert testimony of a "forensic engineer"
that the railroad was "negligent" when it struck the plaintiff. Among the reasons requiring reversible
error was that instead of relying upon "well-settled rules of law, ...
[the expert] made up his own
law" as to the standard of care. Id. at 710.
Note, supra note 1, at 895 suggests that the trial judge instruct the expert witnesses as to the
applicable law so that they will apply the correct criteria in their testimony. On the other hand the
Fifth Circuit has found no abuse of discretion in refusing to admit opinion testimony even where a
"precise statement of the law" precedes the expert's testimony concerning negligence and proximate
cause. Smoger v. Enke, 874 F.2d 295, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1989).
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legal issue." 80 Rule 704(b) now prohibits expert opinion testimony
concerning whether the defendant in a criminal case has the "mental
state or condition" which constitutes an element of the crime or a
defense to it. Under this amendment, experts may testify to their
professional diagnoses and the characteristics of the defendant's
mental condition, but may not testify to the ultimate legal conclusion, e.g., sanity or insanity. In effect, the amendment changes "the
style of the question and answer" that can be used to establish the
intent or lack thereof.8' Thus, in a criminal action, there is a prohibition on expert opinion testimony which applies a legal standard
to determine whether the defendant possessed the necessary state of
mind.
There has been little, if any, analysis of the impact of Rule 704(b)
upon the interpretation of Rule 704(a). In adopting the amendment,
Congress may have changed or affected the interpretation of 704(a).
One could apply the principle of statutory construction, that in construing legislation a court should not assume Congress intended to
enact unnecessary statutes.8 2 If this principle is applied, Rule 704(b)
should be construed to restrict the admissibility of evidence, which
would have been admissible before the amendment, under Rule
704(a). To construe Rule 704(b) otherwise would be to imply the
enactment of Congress was meaningless. If Rule 704(a) prohibits the
testimony, there was no reason for Congress to adopt 704(b). Under
the foregoing analysis, expert testimony that is now prohibited by
Rule 704(b), as to whether an accused possessed the necessary mental
state to commit a crime, was admissible before the amendment.
These questions involve the application of a legal standard or definition to a set of facts. Thus it can be argued that under Federal
Rule 704(a) expert opinion applying a legal standard generally would
be admissible.
80. United States v. Cox, 826 F.2d 1518, 1524 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028
(1988) (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADtmv. NEWS 3182, 3412).

81. United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986).
See also Cox, 826 F.2d at 1524-25.
82. Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Sutton v. United States,
819 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987); Consumers Union v. Sawhill, 512 F.2d 1112, 1118 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1975).
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There appear to be at least two reasons why this rule of statutory
construction should not be adopted. First, there has been obvious
confusion about the type of opinion testimony admissible under Rule
704(a). The amendment may have been adopted simply to eliminate
that confusion with respect to one type of expert testimony in criminal cases. Second, the amendment was adopted not as a result of
any recommendation by the Advisory Committee, but rather as a
part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,83 which was enacted in reaction to John Hinkley's successful insanity defense in
his trial for the attempted assassination of President Reagan. There
is no indication that Congress gave any significant thought to whether
the testimony prohibited in Rule 704(b) was or was not admissible
under Rule 704(a). 84
2.

Non-Jury Trials

In Hogan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,85 the Eighth Circuit suggested that the admissibility of opinions applying a legal standard
will differ depending on whether the opinion is offered in a bench
trial or before a jury. In Hogan, the admissibility of opinion testimony as to whether the defendant had practiced discrimination was
upheld by the Eighth Circuit. 86 The court reasoned that the risks of
misleading the trier-of-fact were not present since the judge, who
served as the fact-finder in the Title VII claims, "was not likely to
18 7
be misled by lay witness opinion using the term 'discriminate.'
The court also observed that the trial judge permitted the witness
to answer the question based on a definition supplied by the court.
However, relaxing the admissibility requirements for these opinions during bench trials overlooks at least two problems. First,
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, similar evidentiary rules are

83. Cox, 826 F.2d at 1524 n.6. See generally Note, Should FloridaFollow the FederalInsanity

Defense, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 793, 794-95 (1987).
84. See Kiernan, Hinckley Verdict Prompts Hill Attack on Insanity Defense, Wash. Post, June
23, 1982, at 1, col. 1; WidespreadPublic Outrage:Hinckley Verdict PromptsBills to OverhaulInsanity

Defense, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPi. 1505 (1982).
85. 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 412.
87. Id. See also Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Ind., Inc., 851 F.2d 456 (1st Cir. 1987).

1990]

EXPERT WITNESSES

generally applied in both jury and non-jury trials; therefore, the
exclusionary rules are the same in both types of trials.88 The danger
of the witness using a definition which differs from that supplied
by the substantive law remains in bench trials.
Another practical reason not to differentiate between the two
fact-finders is that appellate opinions do not always disclose whether
a jury was involved, and confusion will result if different standards
are applied. The parties in a jury trial could erroneously rely upon
an appellate decision in which the expert's opinion was admitted in
a bench trial but the decision failed to disclose the distinction, and
vice versa.
Opinion testimony employing a legal standard will sometimes be
offered to prove a fact which both the court and the jury must
separately determine during the same trial. Some trials involve trying
one cause of action before a jury and, at the same time, trying
another cause of action to the judge. For example, a Title VII claim,
which is tried before a judge, is frequently tried at the same time
with an employment, racial, or age discrimination claim arising out
of the same set of facts, which is tried to a jury. During these
proceedings the jury may have to determine the existence of a fact,
e.g., whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff, which
the court must also determine as a matter of fact during the bench
trial.8 9 Thus, the confusing situation arises in which an expert's opinion applying a legal standard may be admissible in the non-jury
action, with the jury instructed that it could not consider the evidence in determining its claim. Such a result is not desirable. 9°

88. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1920: "[T]he improper evidence is equally inadmissible before
a judge sitting without a jury. Whatever the organization of the tribunal, it is not to waste its time
listening to superfluous and cumbersome testimony." See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas,
Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1988) ("neither this rule nor any other rule or statute creates an
exception [to the Federal Rules of Evidence] for bench trials"); McClure v. Mexia Independent School
Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. See McKee v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1986); McClure, 750 F.2d at
400; King v. Alco Controls Div., 746 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1984).
.SmnN,
supranote 2, 704[02], at 704-16. Other types of trials also may involve
90. But see Vsa
the jury's making a determination as a factual matter in one cause of action, while the judge makes
the same determination as a matter of law in a related cause of action. For example, if a defendant
is charged with making false statements of material fact to a federally insured savings and loan
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Other

The United States Supreme Court construed Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,9 by applying
the principle that "a party contending that legislative action changed
settled law has the burden of showing the legislature intended such
a change. " 92 The weight of authority before Rule 704's adoption
excluded expert testimony embracing a mixed question of law and
fact. 93 The legislative history discloses that Congress did not intend
to change the exclusion of this opinion testimony. 94 Thus, if the
above principle is applied to Rule 704(a), testimony embracing a
mixed question of law and fact will be excluded.
A witness who is applying a legal standard to the facts is doing
no more than counsel does during the arguments to the jury at the
conclusion of all the evidence. In effect, the witness becomes an
advocate. Not only does this use of opinion testimony violate the
spirit of the Federal Rules, since the witness is telling the jury what
result to reach, it also changes the expert's function to one which
argues a view of the facts and the law.
When a witness is asked to express a permissible opinion concerning the existence of ultimate facts, simply asking an additional
question in which the witness applies a legal standard to the facts
will seldom be reversible error. 95 The additional testimony will not
sufficiently influence the outcome. Even though the error may be
association, he will probably be charged with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
Some courts have assumed that whether the statements are material is a question of fact for the jury
with respect to section 1014 and a question of law for the court with respect to section 1001. See
United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 179 (1989), modified, 816 F.2d 1032, aff'd, 838 F.2d 751 (5th
Cir. 1988) (materiality under section 1014 for court). In such a situation, if Rule 704(a) is interpreted
as permitting the admission of opinions involving the application of a legal standard in the bench

trial, though not admissible in the jury trial, there is a danger of confusing the jury by instructing
it that the testimony could only be considered on the section 1014 claim. Even if the testimony would
not be excluded by Rule 704(a), the application of a Rule 403 balancing usually should operate to
exclude the opinion. Leuben, 812 F.2d at 184.
91. 109 S.Ct. 1981 (1989).
92. Id.at 1991.
93. See Skelton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 375 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1962); Morton's Adm'r v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 282 Ky. 174, 138 S.W.2d 345 (1940); Duncan v. Atchinson T.
& S.F. Ry., 86 Kan. 112, 119 P. 356 (1911).
94. W NsTmN, supra note 2, at 704-3.
95. - Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. Ray. 414, 424 (1952).
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harmless, the appellate courts should recognize the admission of the

opinion as error in order to give as much guidance as possible to
the participants in the trial process.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Opinion testimony has traditionally been excluded when it states
a matter of substantive law. 96 This type of testimony does not relate
to the facts of the case but simply expresses an opinion concerning
the applicable statutory and judicial authority which counsel believes
is relevant to the litigation.
The rationale for excluding testimony on substantive law is dif-

ferent from that used to exclude testimony based on an ultimate
issue or which involves a mixed question of law or fact; it is not
that the testimony would not be helpful to the finder of fact, but
rather that the testimony would not be helpful to the trial judge
who can determine the matters of law without the testimony. 97 The

trial judge's function is to rule on questions of law and instruct the
jury thereon. 98 The judge is presumed to have special competence

in this area. 99 Therefore, it is neither an interference with the jury's
role nor the lack of helpfulness to the jury that excludes opinion
testimony on legal matters, but rather it is the special legal knowledge and role of the judge.'0 Helpfulness would also be lacking if

such opinion testimony was admitted and counsel then argued to
the jury what the law was or should be.101
96. See, e.g., Spellman v. American Barge Line Co., 176 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1949); Briney
v. Tri-State Mut. Grain Dealers Fire Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 673, 687, 117 N.W.2d 889, 896-97 (1962);
Mead v. Hellams, 200 Okla. 381, 385, 194 P.2d 603, 607 (1948).
97. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1952 at 103.

98. Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 1986).
99. See United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 1986); WiMoRE, supra note 2,
§ 1952 at 103.
100. See United States v. Brodie, 858 F.2d 492, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. In Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1123 (1975), there was error in the refusal of the trial judge to admit as evidence legal materials,
which included several opinions of the United States Supreme Court, upon which defendants allegedly
relied in deciding not to file tax returns. The court commented:
In the orderly trial of a case, the law is given to the jury by the court and not introduced
as evidence. It is the function of the jury to determine the facts from the evidence and
apply the law as given by the court to the facts as found by them from the evidence.
Obviously, it would be most confusing to a jury to have legal material introduced as evidence
and then argued as to what the law is or ought to be.
Id. at 1253-54. See United States v. Gleason,726 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1984).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence do not speak to the admissibility
of opinion testimony as to the law. Rule 704(a) provides that opinion
testimony which is "otherwise admissible" shall not be excluded
simply because it embraces an ultimate issue. Arguably, opinion testimony regarding the law is not "otherwise admissible," and therefore the adoption of Rule 704 does not change the general
inadmissibility of the testimony. 0 2 On the other hand, Rule 702 provides that the opinion of an expert is admissible when it "assists
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue." Further, opinion testimony as to the relevant law may
assist the jury in understanding the evidence since an expert may
be better able than the court to explain to the jury the applicable
law in an understandable manner. Although jury instructions are
read to the jury and sometimes taken into the jury room, it appears
that the jury often does not fully comprehend them. 103 Thus, permitting the expert to testify on the applicable law might permit a
more thorough, and often more understandable, explanation of the
legal principles. In addition, the opinion might meet the test of
"helpfulness" because simply hearing the law explained a second
time by a different person may aid the jury's comprehension.
A.

Application
The inappropriateness of expert testimony concerning the law
continues to be regularly reaffirmed by recent decisionsY°4 For example, the Second Circuit interpreted the Federal Rules in Marx &
Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc.,"'1 and held that the trial court erred in

permitting the plaintiffs in a securities action to offer the opinion
102. See Adalman, 807 F.2d at 368.
103. See I E. DEvnr & C. BLAcKmAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AN INSTRUCTIONS § 8.01 (3d
ed. 1977). See generally Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979); ELwoRK, SALES AND ALINI,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Stille, DeLorean Acquittal Fuels Furor, NAT'L
L. J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 3; Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, Am. LAW., Dec., 1986, at 7.

104. See United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversible error to permit bankruptcy judge to testify to his interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act and his own orders); Miller v.
Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Iowa 1983) (expert testimony concerning provisions of Iowa Code was

generally inadmissible but it was admitted since counsel "opened the door to the subject of domestic
laws").
105. 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
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of a securities regulation expert. The expert testified as to the legal
obligations which arose from a contract and said that, as a matter
10 6
of law, the defenses asserted by the defendant were unacceptable.
The decision was premised on the interpretation that the Federal
Rules did not change the inadmissibility of expert testimony as to
the applicable law. The court held that "[ilt is not for witnesses to
instruct the jury as to applicable principles of law, but for the
judge."10 7 The court adopted Wigmore's analysis that such testimony
is "superfluous"; the expert opinion was not needed because the
judge, or jury instructed by the judge, can determine the issue equally
well.108
Similarly, in Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co.,1°9 the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to permit a lawyer to testify as
to the meaning and applicability of the securities law as it related
to the facts before the jury, because the opinion "usurped" or interfered with the province of the trial judge to determine and instruct
the jury on the law. 110
On the other hand, other appellate decisions have upheld the
admission of expert legal testimony without any analysis of the issue
by simply stating that the Federal Rules do not prohibit expert testimony which goes to an ultimate issue. For example, in Case &
Co. v. Board of Trade,"' the Seventh Circuit held that the Act
Administrator could express his opinion as to the meaning of the
Commodity Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder, as
2
well as whether the plaintiff complied with the Act and the rule.1
106. Id. at 508.
107. Marx, 550 F.2d at 509-10. See also F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees,
F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Marx with approval).
108. Id. See VrIoMoRE, supra note 2, § 1952, at 103.
109. 807 F.2d. 359 (4th Cir. 1986).
110. The court was also concerned with the jury's looking to the witness, rather than to
judge, for the applicable law. Id. at 366.
111. 523 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 361. See also International Indem. Co. v. Coachman, 181 Ga. App. 82, 85,
S.E.2d 224, 228 (1986) (lawyer's testimony that "the Supreme Court of the United States lacked

810

the
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requisite jurisdiction to review the decision" of the Georgia Supreme Court); In re Estate of Lenahan,
511 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (expert testimony admissible which deals with "complex
and obscure legal questions" which concern "probate law, federal and state estate taxation and will

construction").
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The decision reasoned that the expert opinion was admissible since
the ultimate issue rule "is abolished by Rule 704 . ... "I

Some appellate courts take another approach. They restate the
general rule of exclusion but then conclude that opinion testimony,
which appears to violate the rule, does not.114 For example, in United
States v. Unruh,"5 a prosecution for a bank-fraud scheme, the government offered expert testimony of the FDIC bank examiner con-

cerning the meaning of Regulation 0, which prohibits certain bank
loans to insiders. The Ninth Circuit first noted, "[w]e have condemned the practice of attempting to introduce law as evidence ....
The problems of using experts to displace the role of the trial judge
are exacerbated here because the case is complex and an expert may
receive undue attention from the jury. 116 However, the court went
on to hold that the admission of the testimony was justified without

discussing how it differed from the usual situation. According to
Unruh, the expert's testimony
correctly explains Regulation 0. The trial judge's decision to let the testimony in,
rather than explaining Regulation 0 in his instructions to the jury, is justified by
the aid that it gave the jury in understanding other evidence presented as part
of the prosecution's case. Any error on this point was not prejudicial. 7

113. 523 F.2d 361. Only opinion testimony which would be admissible at trial may be considered
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Hawley, 768 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1985). The government called
an expert who testified that because of the defendant's income and marital status he was required
to file an income tax return during certain years. See id. at 251. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's prohibition of the defendant's cross-examination of the expert concerning the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs as to whether the return was required and commented:
The government simply had asked the witness what Section 612 said and whether, given
the facts presented at trial, the defendant was required to comply with that section. Thus,
while the government's expert witness did testify as to an ultimate issue in the trial, as is
permitted by FEa R. Evin. 704, the witness did not interpret the law, as the defendant
insists. It is clear that the law is to be given to the jury by the trial judge, and not introduced
as evidence ....
This is true whether the evidence is introduced as an exhibit, ...
or in
the form of opinion testimony.
Id. at 251-52. The expert's testimony during direct examination as to the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code appears to violate the spirit of the Eighth Circuit's rationale. See id.
115. 855 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
116. Id. at 1376.
117. Id. But cf. Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 456, 468 (Ist Cir. 1988)
(the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting expert opinion testimony as to the "interpretation of specific OSHA regulations"). After noting that the evidence was being proffered in a
bench trial where the trial court's discretion was at "maximum girth," apparently because of the
judge's expertise in the law the First Circuit suggested that the opinion evidence would not have
assisted the judge sitting as the trier of fact.
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The Tenth Circuit adopted a unique rule in Specht v. Jensen,"1 8
where it considered the admission of extensive expert testimony concerning the law of search and seizure in a civil rights action. The
en banc decision first observed that an expert may not discourse
"broadly over the entire range of the applicable law" and may not
attempt to "define the legal parameters within which the jury must
exercise its fact-finding function.""' 9 The court determined that since
the expert "painstakingly" developed his conclusions over "an entire
day" of testimony which touched on every element of the plaintiff's
burden of proof, the testimony was more like a definition of the
legal parameters of the case than an opinion which helped the jury
understand the facts introduced in evidence.
The Tenth Circuit seems to condone the admission of a brief
statement of the expert's opinion regarding the relevant law followed
by the witness's application of the law to the facts. However, the
Tenth Circuit condemns admission of any broader legal testimony.
Apparently the amount of testimony concerning the law is being
disapproved. In the last sentence of its majority opinion, the Specht
court approved the testimony of a "legal expert who explains a
discrete point of law which is helpful to the jury's understanding
20
of the facts."'
The rationale for a distinction between the admissibility of an
expert opinion as to a "discrete point of law" and broader legal
testimony is unclear. The extent of the legal opinion seems not to
be a basis to distinguish admissibility, but rather a basis of determining whether an error in admitting the opinion testimony was
reversible.
Occasionally, a substantive legal principle will require or permit
proof of the law. In these cases, proving the state of the law is a
material element to a claim or defense. The admission of expert
118. 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 792 (1989).
119. Id. at 809-10. The court was careful, however, to point out that the effect of the opinion
was not to exclude "all testimony regarding legal issues," stating that a witness may properly refer
to the law in expressing an opinion and an expert may couch his testimony in legal terms if he is

aiding the jury. Id.
120. Id. at 810.
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legal opinion in these cases is obviously necessary. However, it is
a unique situation and is not authority for the general admissibility
of the testimony. For example, when a party relies on foreign law,
most jurisdictions authorize, or require, the admission of an expert's
opinion to prove that foreign law. 12' This testimony is generally only
given before the court, out of the jury's presence. 22 When a party's
state of mind is a factual issue, the substantive law may be probative
of that issue. For example, there is some authority for the admission
of expert testimony concerning the unsettled state of federal income
tax law to prove the taxpayer's lack of willfulness in violating the
tax law. 23 This testimony has typically been offered in income tax
cases where the taxpayer has proffered evidence that a particular
area of tax law is unsettled and complex, with the taxpayer claiming
that he could not have acted willfully in light of the unsettled state
of the law. It is important to note that in these situations the expert
testimony is not being offered to instruct and inform the trier of
fact as to the applicable law.
B. Policy Considerations
In determining the proper construction of the Federal Rules with
respect to opinion testimony on the law, it is helpful to consider
underlying policy considerations. The most persuasive reason to admit opinions on the law is that it may be desirable for the jury to
understand the governing legal principles before the trial judge in-

121. See Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting v. Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc., 839 F.2d 780,
782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 82 (1988).
122. See, e.g., Adalman, 807 F.2d at 366; WioMoRE, supra note 2, § 1952; McCoRMCK, supra
note 79, § 12.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 100 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding expert testimony
that the tax treatment of certain proceeds was "novel and unsettled" admissible on the issue of the

taxpayer's willfulness, even though there was no evidence that the defendant actually knew of the
conflict in the law). Cf. United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1984) (possibly limiting
Garber to its "unique, indeed near bizarre, facts"); United States v. Howard, 855 F.2d 832, 837
(lth Cir. 1988) (discussing Garberand Burton). But see United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593, 599

(6th Cir. 1986) (specifically rejecting Garber); United States v. Malas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Gleason, 726 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1984).
See also United States v. Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to permit the defendant to prove international law which she claimed was the basis of her lack of intent to commit
the crime of willfully damaging government property).
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structs the jury on the law after the presentation of all the evidence.
Otherwise, it may not be possible for jurors to recognize the relevance or importance of a fact witness' testimony.
While the trial court may have the discretion to give a preliminary
charge on the pertinent law to the jury before any evidence is introduced,'24 such instructions are seldom given. Permitting an expert
to make a short statement concerning the relevant law during his
testimony may enable the jury to better understand the significance
of the facts or of the expert's interpretation of them. If the jurors
do not have an understanding of the law at the time they hear the
testimony, the significance of the testimony may be lost, particularly
in a long or complicated trial. Thus, it could be argued that opinion
testimony on the law meets the test of helpfulness in that it aids
the jury in understanding the evidence.
Another reason supporting the admission of expert legal opinions
is that the expert may be more effective than the court in explaining
the applicable law to the jury. There is significant evidence that
jurors frequently do not fully comprehend jury instructions, which
are usually only read to them by the court. 125 If the jury's understanding of a point of law is of particular importance to a party,
that party may desire to offer an expert's explanation to the jury.
Counsel may try to offer this opinion testimony to educate the
judge on a matter of law or to give support to an interpretation of
an unsettled legal principle in the light most favorable to their clients. It can be argued that if a lawyer testifies as an expert on the
state of the law, rather than appearing as an advocate and arguing
to the court, the obligation of the oath may cause the lawyer to
give a more objective interpretation of the law.
The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility permits a lawyer
as an advocate to argue "any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion

124. See 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLAci-AR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 5.03 (3d
ed. 1977).
125. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail.' ' 26
Similarly, the newer ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
recognize that "a lawyer is not required to make a disinterested
exposition of the law."' 27 A lawyer under oath would be held to a
higher standard.
In addition, if an expert testifies before the court, cross-examination is available. Thus, the bases of the expert's conclusions can
be tested. However, if the court simply reads law review articles or
books written by that same expert, cross-examination is not available
and it is more difficult to attack the reliability of the opinions expressed. While this argument has considerable appeal if the court
is determining the applicable law outside the presence of the jury,128
it fails to address the admissibility of such testimony before the jury.
The strongest arguments supporting the admission of expert legal
testimony essentially are premised on making the advocate's case
more persuasive for the trier of fact. However, if one expert is
permitted to testify regarding the applicable law, other parties will
be able to call their own experts. It is unlikely that two experts,
even those called by parties with similar interests, would agree on
an identical statement of a substantive legal principle. These differing explanations would confuse and mislead the jury. 29 If the
parties call experts who testify before the jury as to conflicting versions of the law, such testimony would not meet the "helpfulness"
test.
Although the trial court's instructions to the jury on the applicable law at the close of the case may eliminate the confusion caused
by the expert testimony, still another explanation of the law might
further exacerbate the confusion. In this situation, the jury might
126. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1981); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBiLTrrY EC 7-3 (1981) (requiring a lawyer to
bounds of the law"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will
most favorable to his client").
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
advocate "must recognize the existence of pertinent
128. See Note, supra note 5, at 803-04 (arguing
before the "determiner of law").
129. See Curtis, 782 F.2d at 599.

"resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the
REsPONsIBILITY EC 7-23 (recognizing that "[t]he
present and argue the existing law in the light
Rule 3.3 comment (1981). Note, however, the
legal authorities."
that expert legal testimony should be admissible
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be required to assume part of the judge's responsibility to rule on
questions of law in determining which expert's opinion is accurate. 130
The most significant reason for excluding expert opinion on the
law remains that permitting such opinion is inherently inconsistent
with our judicial system. It is the judge's function to determine the
applicable law and instruct the jury upon it; it is the jury's function
to consider the evidence, to find the facts and to apply the law as
received from the trial judge.131 Permitting experts to offer their
opinions as to the law shifts to the advocates and their experts the
power to inform the jury as to the applicable law. 1 2 There is a real
danger that the jury would look to the expert, rather than the court,
for their instructions on the law. 13 3 Permitting a lawyer to testify to
legal principles, rather than arguing them as counsel, also deprives
the judge of the give and take with counsel that has been helpful
in judges' arriving at correct determinations. If an erroneous legal
principle is applied by the trial judge, the aggrieved party has relief
on appeal. If the jury decides on a point of law which is erroneous,
the aggrieved party has no recourse.
If counsel needs to educate the jury as to the applicable law so
that it understands the significance of certain testimony, he can do
so during the voir dire examination of the jury as well as during
his opening statement and final argument to the jury. If it is desirable for the jury to be made aware of the applicable law prior
to the completion of all of the testimony, trial judges should be
willing to give a short set of instructions at the beginning of, or
during, the trial.
Finally, many feel that our jury process has already been overrun
with experts and that they have taken over the courtroom. This has
resulted, at least partially, from the "let-it-all-in" philosophy which
some judges have apparently adopted with respect to expert testi130. See id. at 599-600.
131. In fact, the jury is usually so informed in the jury instructions. See 1 E. DEvrrT & C.
BLACKmAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 10.01, pp. 258-59 (3d ed. 1977).
132. See Curtis, 782 F.2d at 600; MCCORMICK, supra note 79 § 12.
133. See, e.g., Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 792 (1989); Curtis, 782 F.2d at 593; Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir.
1986); WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 704[02], at 704-15.
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mony. Permitting expert testimony concerning the law would be the
final step in turning the courtroom over to experts. Not only would
the experts be telling the jury what the ultimate facts were, they
would be instructing them on the applicable law. While it would be
a boon for law professors and some lawyers, the admission of expert
testimony as to the law is both logically and intuitively undesirable.
There is no indication that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence intended that their actions would result in an expert's being
permitted to assume the role of an advocate and to testify to the
applicable law. Neither the language of the Rules nor the underlying
policy support the admission of these opinions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Much of the difficulty in determining the admissibility of opinion
testimony involving legal conclusions flows from the appellate courts'
use of a very broad abuse of discretion standard to review trial court
rulings. 3 4 Some conflicting decisions by trial and appellate courts
are reconciled and explained on the basis that neither the admission
nor the exclusion of particular opinion testimony would be an abuse
35
of discretion.1
This broad abuse of discretion standard may be appropriate, but
it leads to undesirable results since these appellate decisions provide
little guidance for trial lawyers as to the standards that should be
applied regarding the admissibility of opinion testimony on the law.
The legal system is not well served if the admissibility of this type
of opinion and the outcome of the trial can vary from trial judge
to trial judge. The use of this standard has resulted in appellate
decisions that often fail to recognize the difference between an erroneous evidentiary ruling and an erroneous ruling which is reversible error.
In criminal cases, confusion may also result from result-driven
decisions upholding the admission of various types of expert tes134. See Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763, 776-78 (1lth Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds,
862 F.2d 1471 (1lth Cir. 1989).
135. See, e.g., Smogor, 874 F.2d at 296-97; Specht, 853 F.2d at 810, (en banc) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 792 (1989); Harris v. Pacific Floor Machine Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d
64, 68 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, J., concurring).
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timony offered by the prosecution. It is difficult not to admit similar
types of opinion testimony using the same rationale when it is offered in other types of cases. Some of the inconsistency may be
caused by the reasoning process employed by the court. The decisions which find no abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony
concerning a mixed question of law and fact usually do not discuss
the Advisory Committee Notes. 13 6 Instead they reason from the express language of the Rule. On the other hand, decisions upholding
the exclusion of opinions regarding a mixed question of law and
fact often rely heavily upon the Advisory Committee's intent as
137
found in its Notes.
The United States Supreme Court recently indicated the proper
method of construing a Federal Rule of Evidence in Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 3 8 where it resolved a conflict among the circuits
concerning the proper interpretation of Federal Rule 803(8)(C), which
deals with the admissibility of evaluative reports by governmental
agencies. In determining whether a "narrow" or "broader" interpretation of the Rule was appropriate, the Court first determined
that since the Federal Rules of Evidence were a legislative enactment,
the principles of statutory construction should be applied. First, the
Court consulted the Rule's language. 139 After determining that the
language of Rule 803(8)(C) does not clearly indicate the proper interpretation, the Court turned to the Rule's legislative history which
provided "no definitive guide to the [C]ongressional understand-

ing.,, 140

Because Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee's draft
of Rule 803(8)(C), the Court found that "the Committee's commentary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the

136. See, e.g., United States v. Battle, 859 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kinsey,
843 F.2d 383, 387-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2882, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 99 (1988);
Dotson, 817 F.2d at 1131-32, modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1987).
137. See, e.g., Specht, 853 F.2d at 807-08; McGowan, 863 F.2d at 1272-73.
138. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
139. Id. at 445-46. See also Bock Laundry Machine, 109 S. Ct. at 1984 (using this same method
of analysis to construe Federal Rule 609; however, after determining that the "plain language" of

the Rule commands one interpretation, the Court determined, for various reasons, that it could not
accept that interpretation and adopted the legislative intent).
140. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 448.
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document Congress enacted. 141 The Court then examined the Committee Notes and determined that the Advisory Committee intended
a particular construction of Rule 803(8)(C) and adopted that interpretation to resolve the conflict among the circuits. 42
If the method of analysis used in Beech Aircraft is employed to
determine the admissibility of opinions which both embrace a mixed
question of law and fact and state substantive legal principles, the
Federal Rules of Evidence generally will be interpreted to continue
to exclude such opinion testimony. Looking first at the plain language of the Federal Rules, the proper interpretation is unclear.
Neither Rule 704 nor any other rule speaks directly to the admissibility of these opinions. Moreover, there is no legislative history
of 704(a) to consult since Congress adopted the Rule as proposed
by the Advisory Committee without amendment or apparent discussion. In this situation the Court has indicated that the Advisory
Committee's commentary should be "particularly relevant" in determining the proper interpretation of Rule 704(a).
As previously discussed, the Advisory Committee's comments
clearly demonstrate that it did not intend for Rule 704(a) to permit
the admissibility of opinion testimony on a mixed question of law
and fact. 143 While the Advisory Committee Notes do not speak directly to the admissibility of expert opinion as to substantive law,
it seems extremely doubtful that the Committee would have intended
to allow testimony as to the law since it did not intend to admit
opinions as to mixed questions of law and fact.
The Supreme Court has not been hesitant in recent years to accept and decide evidentiary issues arising under the Federal Rules
of Evidence which involve matters of less widespread application
and importance than do the issues discussed in this article. 144 It would
141. Id. at 448, n.9.
142. See id. at 448-50.

143. See Note, supra note 1, at 897-98 (arguing for admissibility of most expert testimony embracing a mixed question of law and fact). Apparently, the author believes that the present Advisory
Committee Note is not controlling. However, language is suggested to be included in a "redrafted"
Advisory Committee Note which would reflect the author's approach. See id.
144. See, e.g., Bock Laundry, 109 S. Ct. at 1981 (whether felony convictions offered to impeach

in civil case are admissible without the trial court applying a balancing test); Beech Aircraft, 109 S.

1990]

EXPERT WITNESSES

be desirable for the Court to resolve the uncertainty and confusion
with respect to the admissibility of opinion testimony regarding legal
conclusions, both those embracing a mixed question of law and fact
as well as those expressing substantive legal principles. Clearer guidelines are needed for determining when, if ever, opinions involving
legal conclusions are admissible. If the analysis suggested in this
Article is ultimately adopted, it will necessitate drawing a sometimes
145
thin line. Thus far, the Court has not shied from that task.

Ct. at 439 (whether evaluative opinions are admissible in civil cases under Rule 803(8)(C)); Huddleston
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (standard for admission of extrinsic fact evidence pursuant to
Rule 404(b)); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (whether co-conspirator statement may
be considered in determining whether foundation has been laid for the admission of co-conspirator
statement); Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990) (whether extrinsic fact evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) when defendant has been acquitted of committing the extrinsic act).
145. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600 (1989); Kostelecky, 837 F.2d at 830.

